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Abstract
■ According to embodied theories, the symbols used by lan-
guage are meaningful because they are grounded in percep-
tion, action, and emotion. In contrast, according to abstract
symbol theories, meaning arises from the syntactic combina-
tion of abstract, amodal symbols. If language is grounded in
internal bodily states, then one would predict that emotion
affects language. Consistent with this, advocates of embodied
theories propose a strong link between emotion and language
[Havas, D., Glenberg, A. M., & Rinck, M. Emotion simulation
during language comprehension. Psychonomic Bulletin & Re-
view, 14, 436–441, 2007; Niedenthal, P. M. Embodying emotion.
Science, 316, 1002–1005, 2007]. The goal of this study was to
test abstract symbol vs. embodied views of language by investi-
gating whether mood affects semantic processing. To this aim,
we induced different emotional states (happy vs. sad) by present-
ing film clips that displayed fragments from a happy movie or a
sad movie. The clips were presented before and during blocks of
sentences in which the cloze probability of mid-sentence critical
words varied (high vs. low). Participants read sentences while
ERPs were recorded. The mood induction procedure was suc-
cessful: Participants watching the happy film clips scored higher
on a mood scale than those watching the sad clips. For N400,
mood by cloze probability interactions were obtained. The N400
cloze effect was strongly reduced in the sad mood compared
with the happy mood condition. Furthermore, a difference in
late positivity was only present for the sad mood condition. The
mood by semantic processing interaction observed for N400
supports embodied theories of meaning and challenges abstract
symbol theories that assume that processing of word meaning
reflects a modular process. ■
INTRODUCTION
Meaning is a fundamental aspect of language. The sentence
“He killed her” means something radically different from
the sentence “He kissed her.” The difference lies in the
meanings of the individual action verbs “kill” versus “kiss.”
The verb kill captures an act of violence leading to irrevers-
ible death, whereas the verb “kiss” captures an action of
tenderness typically reflecting affection. In this example,
the words also differ in emotional valence, with killing de-
picting a negative (unpleasant) word and kissing depicting
a positive (pleasant) word. The aim of this article was to
shed light on whether, and if so how, emotional state af-
fects semantic processing in language comprehension.
In cognitive psychology, two theoretical perspectives
regarding the representation of word meaning have been
presented. According to the cognitive science view—that
dominated the fields of linguistics and psycholinguistics
for the past 40 years—the brain is conceived of as an or-
gan for building internal representations of the external
world. A key assumption of this approach is that knowl-
edge resides in a semantic memory system separate from
the brainʼs modal systems for perception (audition, vision),
action (movement, proprioception), and emotion (Fodor,
1975). In line with this, classical theories of meaning are
abstract symbol theories (e.g., Anderson, Matessa, &
Lebiere, 1997; Landauer & Dumais, 1997; Masson, 1995;
Collins & Loftus, 1975). According to these theories, mean-
ing arises from the syntactic combination of abstract,
amodal (nonperceptual) symbols that are arbitrarily re-
lated to entities in the real world. For example, according
to one of the most frequently cited theories of Collins
and Loftus (1975), meaning arises from the pattern of re-
lations among nodes in a network. Every node in the
network corresponds to an undefined word, and the set
of nodes to which a particular node is connected cor-
responds to the words in the dictionary definition. The
conceptual network is organized according to semantic
similarity and represents facts about concepts. For in-
stance, for the concept lion, it represents facts such as lions
are large, lions live in Africa, lions are feline, lions have a
mane, and so forth. This conception gave rise to different
types of representation, such as feature lists, schemata,
semantic nets, and connectionism. Mathematical high-
dimensional models of meaning (e.g., latent semantic analy-
sis [LSA] of Landauer & Dumais, 1997) have been presented
as a new variant of the classical abstract symbol theories.
Here the meaning of a word is its vector representation
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in a high-dimensional space, and these vectors are very
similar to the abstract symbols used in the classical theories
of meaning. A major strength of the classical approach to
meaning is that abstract amodal symbols have been very
successful in representing several kinds of knowledge (i.e.,
types and tokens, propositions, and abstract concepts)
and to combine symbols productively. A fundamental cri-
tique is how meaning can arise from abstract symbols not
grounded in perception or action (i.e., the grounding prob-
lem). As forcefully argued by Searle (1980), manipulation
of abstract amodal symbols produces more abstract sym-
bols, not meaning.
A different theoretical perspective about the represen-
tation of word meanings are perceptual theories of cog-
nition. Recently, these theories gained popularity in the
form of embodied approaches to cognition (e.g., Zwaan &
Taylor, 2006; Barsalou, 1999; MacWhinney, 1999; Glenberg,
1997; Lakoff, 1987). Here, the brainʼs primary purpose is
not to represent the external world but to regulate behav-
ior. On this view, the brain is an equal player, next to
the organismʼs body and the world. These three factors
together form part of the physical substrate that causes
behavior and cognition. A central question for embodied
theories is how the brain, the body, and the world (indi-
vidually and jointly) contribute to the creation and main-
tenance of real world behavior. A key assumption of the
embodied approach is that mental processes such as think-
ing or language understanding are based on the physical or
imagined interactions (Barsalou, 2008; Stanfield & Zwaan,
2001) that people have with their environment. The em-
bodied framework has been applied to the field of lan-
guage (e.g., Yeh & Barsalou, 2006; Zwaan & Madden,
2005; Glenberg & Robertson, 2000; MacWhinney, 1999;
Glenberg, 1997). The starting point is that the structure of
the body is very important in that it determines the range
of effective actions. Here the term affordances plays a cru-
cial role. Following Gibson (1979), embodied researchers
define affordances as the actions suggested by a particular
object (e.g., Borghi, 2005). For instance, the affordances of
a knife include cutting several kinds of objects, or defend-
ing oneself or somebody else, or attacking somebody,
but they do not include watering flowers. The range of
possible actions suggested by an object also includes new
actions that have not been previously performed.
According to embodied approaches, meaning is based
on our current interactions or previous experiences of in-
teractions with objects in different kinds of environments.
Current or Past Body × Environment interactions guide
us in how to think about, that is, simulate the perceptual
and action details required by a situation. The most fully
developed embodied view of language comprehension
is the Indexical Hypothesis of Glenberg (1997; se also
Glenberg & Robertson, 1999, 2000). According to this
hypothesis, as a sentence is comprehended, its individual
words are indexed to perceptual symbols, which are com-
bined to produce a simulation of what the sentence de-
scribes. Meaningfulness resides in the knowledge of the
possibilities versus limitations of the human body and in-
dividual experiences. One main advantage of this approach
is that it brings us closer to a solution of the grounding
problem (Searle, 1980). On the negative side, embodied
theories have been criticized as being too vague, and it is
clear that a further specification is needed before their
merits to language comprehension can be fully assessed.
Findings from cognitive neuroscience have challenged
abstract symbol theories. A striking example is the work
from Pulvermüller (2005). He investigated the processing
of verbs involving actions with different parts of the body
(leg, hand, and face). Pulvermüller showed that when partic-
ipants read words for an action the motor system becomes
active to represent its meaning. More specifically, verbs for
head, arm, and leg actions produce head, arm, and leg ac-
tivations in the respective areas of the motor cortex. These
activations, as revealed by magneto-encephalogram, took
place very fast—that is, within just a few hundreds of milli-
seconds. In addition, Tettamanti et al. (2005) have shown
that themotor regions of the brain also become active when
participants listen to action-related sentences. These results
seem inconsistent with one of the main tenets of abstract
symbol theories that knowledge in the form of abstract sym-
bols is stored in a semantic network, separate from the
brainʼs modal systems for action, perception, and emotion.
Chwilla, Kolk, and Vissers (2007) used a different ap-
proach to test abstract symbol theories against embodied
theories of meaning. They recorded ERPs to explore how
the brain establishes novel meanings not stored in seman-
tic memory. This was accomplished by presenting one or
more context-setting sentences followed by a critical sen-
tence to which ERPs were recorded that described a novel
sensible or novel senseless situation. For example, the
(context-setting) sentence “The scouts wanted to make
music at the campfire” was followed by the critical sen-
tence “The boys searched for branches/bushes [sensible/
senseless] with which they went drumming and had a lot
of fun.” Novel sensible contexts that were not associatively
nor semantically related were matched to novel senseless
contexts in terms of familiarity and semantic similarity by
LSA.1 Abstract symbol theories like LSA can only discover
meaningfulness by consulting stored symbolic knowledge
and therefore cannot explain facilitation for novel sensible
situations. This constraint does not hold for embodied
theories. Here what is meaningful and not depends on
our knowledge of the possibilities and limitations of our
body. Chwilla et al. found a facilitation for novel meanings
for a language-relevant ERP component, the N400, that is
highly sensitive to semantic processing (i.e., a reduction in
N400 amplitude for novel sensible compared with novel
senseless meanings) that was independent of task. Impor-
tantly, novel meanings were created on the spot—that is,
within the same time window as familiar associative and
semantic relationships (300–500 msec). The demonstra-
tion of immediate facilitation for novel meanings supports
embodied views and calls into question disembodied ab-
stract symbol theories.
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The goal of this article was to further test abstract symbol
versus embodied theories of meaning against each other
by investigating the effects of emotional context on se-
mantic processing. According to abstract symbol theories,
processing of word meaning is performed by a central
cognitive module—that is, separable from the systems for
perception, motor action, and emotion. Therefore, activa-
tion of word meaning should be resistant to fluctuations in
(emotional) context. In contrast, according to embodied
theories, words are meaningful because they are grounded
in perception, action, and emotion. In the present article,
ERPs were recorded, which provide a continuous record
of brain activity and therefore permit insight into the time
course with which a participantʼs emotional state affects se-
mantic processing. This in contrast, with previous studies
on the emotion by language interplay that recorded RTs
in judgment tasks (see below; Havas, Glenberg, & Rinck,
2007). To approximate processes of normal language un-
derstanding, in the present study, participants did nothing
else than what they do in normal life—that is, to read for
comprehension.
In this ERP study, we attempt to separate the two classes
of models by exploring the effects of emotional context,
in particular a participantʼs emotional state, on semantic
processing. As proposed by Niedenthal (2007), according
to embodied theories perceiving and thinking about emo-
tion involve perceptual, somatovisceral, and motoric re-
experiencing (simulation) of the relevant emotion in oneʼs
self. If language is grounded in bodily states, then onewould
predict that emotion affects language. Consistent with this,
advocates of embodied theories predict an interaction be-
tween emotion and language (Havas et al., 2007; Niedenthal,
2007; Glenberg, Havas, Becker, & Rinck, 2005; Damasio,
1994).
Supporting evidence for this claim comes from Strack,
Martin, and Stepper (1988). They investigated the effects
of facial expression on the comprehension of cartoons.
Facial expression was varied by having participants either
hold a pen between their lips, thereby inhibiting the facial
muscles used in smiling (zygomaticus major or the risorius
muscles), or by holding a pen between their teeth in a
way that facilitates the contraction of the latter facial mus-
cles used in smiling. They found a reciprocal relationship
between the facial emotional expression and the way in
which emotional information was interpreted: participants
who were led to smile judged the cartoons as funnier than
participants whose smile was blocked. The effectiveness
of this procedure developed by Strack et al. to reliably shift
the body into a happy state versus unhappy state has been
well documented (e.g., Soussignan, 2002; Berkowitz &
Troccoli, 1990). Hence, Havas et al. (2007) used this pro-
cedure to explore the effects of emotional state on the
processing of sentences describing pleasant versus unpleas-
ant sentences. Participants read happy, sad, and angry sen-
tences. In Experiment 1, participants judged whether the
sentences were pleasant or unpleasant, whereas in Experi-
ment 2 they judged whether the sentences were easy or
hard to comprehend. Regardless of the task demands,
participants were faster to read and judge sentences de-
scribing a pleasant event (e.g., “Your lover chases you
playfully around your bedroom”) when holding the pen
between the teeth (smiling) than when holding the pen
in between the lips (frowning). The opposite pattern was
found for sentences describing an unpleasant situation.
These findings of Havas et al. fit well with the embodiment
claim according to which a full understanding of language
about emotional states requires that those emotional states
are literally embodied (simulated) during comprehension
thereby recruiting the same neural and bodily mechanisms
that are involved during emotional experiences.
The general goal of this article was to contrast embodied
versus disembodied theories by investigating whether a par-
ticipantʼs emotional state affects on-line semantic process-
ing in language comprehension, as tapped by N400 (Kutas
& Hillyard, 1980; for a review, see Kutas & Federmeier,
2000). Relevant for this study, N400 amplitude systemati-
cally varies with the degree of expectedness of a word in
a given context; the higher the expectancy the smaller
N400.2 The graded function of N400 amplitude on the
basis of expectancy is referred to as the N400 cloze effect.
We test the models against each other by investigating
whether the N400 cloze effect is modulated by mood. This
is examined by inducing different emotional states (a happy
mood vs. a sad mood) while participants read sentences
part of which contained high-cloze sentences (e.g., “In that
library the pupils borrow books…”) and low-cloze sen-
tences (e.g., “The pillows are stuffed with books…”). In
the emotion literature, it has been shown that films are a
highly effective means to induce both positive and negative
mood states (Westermann, Spies, Stahl, & Hesse, 1996; see
Methods). Therefore, in the present study, we manipulate
participantsʼ mood by presenting film clips that either dis-
played fragments from a happy movie or a sad movie.
The rational is as follows: If we succeed in inducing dif-
ferences in emotional state, then we can test embodied
theories against abstract symbol theories: In particular, if,
as proposed by advocates of embodied theories language
is grounded in bodily states then emotional state should
affect on-line language comprehension. The proposed
mechanism that gives rise to effects of emotion is simula-
tion of an emotional state. Whether “emotional simulation”
impacts on-line semantic processing can be assessed from
N400. If so, this should be reflected by an interaction be-
tween mood and the N400 cloze effect. In contrast, as
sketched above according to abstract symbol theories,
emotional state should not affect semantic processing.
Little yet is known about the mood by semantics inter-
face. For N400 few studies have probed for the effects of
emotion. With respect to the effects of a wordʼs emotional
content, an increase in N400 amplitude was reported to
words that were emotionally inconsistent with the prosody
(happy or sad voice) of a preceding sentence (Schirmer,
Kotz, & Friederici, 2002, 2005) or with the prosody of
how a word was pronounced (Schirmer & Kotz, 2003).
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Some studies have observed a facilitation in semantic
processing for pleasant as opposed to unpleasant words
(Herbert, Junghofer, & Kissler, 2008; Kiefer, Schuch,
Schenck, & Fiedler, 2007).
With regard to the effect of a participantʼs emotional
state, Chung et al. (1996) investigated the effects of a
positive versus negative mood (induced by imagination
by asking subjects to think of happy or sad life events)
on the comprehension of short life stories whose final
word depicted a positive or negative outcome or was
semantically incongruent. N400 amplitude was largest to
semantically incongruent words but was also larger to
mood-incongruent than mood-congruent words. These
results were taken to suggest that mood imposes an emo-
tional constraint on the access of semantic word mean-
ing. In a second study, Federmeier, Kirson, Moreno, and
Kutas (2001) studied the effects of a mildly positive mood
and a neutral mood on semantic memory organization.
To this aim, they compared the N400 with a highly ex-
pected exemplar with the N400 to a within-category vio-
lation or between-category violation (e.g., “They wanted
to make the hotel look more like a tropical resort.” So,
along the driveway, they planted rows of “palms” [expected
exemplar], “pines” [within-category violation], “tulips”
[between-category violation].) A mildly positive mood
was induced by presenting pictures of positive items (e.g.,
cute animals) and a neutral mood was induced by present-
ing pictures of neutral items (e.g., household objects). The
main result was that a mildly positive mood relative to a
neutral mood facilitated semantic processing (as reflected
by a decrease in N400 amplitude) of distantly related un-
expected items (i.e., between-category violations). In
a third study, Pratt and Kelly (2008) recorded N400s to
positively and negatively valenced words (e.g., love vs.
death) while they induced differences in mood by pro-
viding (false) positive or negative feedback. An increase
in a frontally distributed negativity within the N400 win-
dow was reported for positive words relative to negative
words but only when subjects were in a positive mood.
However, because of methodological concerns, in par-
ticular, the use of a small set of items, frequent stimulus
repetition and the use of one-sided statistical tests, the
reliability of the results remains unclear. In sum, previous
results suggest that a positive mood may facilitate seman-
tic processing.
In the present article, we investigate the effects of a par-
ticipantʼs emotional state on semantic processing by com-
paring the standard N400 cloze effect in a happy emotional
state with that in a sad emotional state. Thus, opposite
to the Federmeier et al. (2001) study that tested for dif-
ferences in ERPs between a (mildly) positive mood and a
neutral mood, in the present study a broader spectrum of
the mood continuum was investigated by directly compar-
ing the effects of a positive mood with those of a negative
mood to the same language materials. This approach pro-
vides a more complete picture about potential effects of
emotion/mood on processes of language comprehension
and may provide a first step towards exploring the relation
between language and emotion with ERPs in patients.
The crucial question of the present article is whether
an interaction between emotional state and N400 cloze
probability effect will be observed. Abstract symbol theo-
ries do not predict an interaction between language and
emotion, as processing of word meaning is performed
by a central cognitive module—that is, separable from the
systems for perception, motor action, and most impor-
tantly, for the present study, emotions. The presence of
an interaction between language and emotion, therefore,
would challenge abstract symbol theories and support
embodied theories of meaning. Importantly, in contrast
with previous RT studies on the relation between emotion
and language, the use of ERPs allows us to track the time
course at which emotion affects semantic processing—
as tapped by N400—in real time. The predictions for the
ERPs were as follows: With respect to the effects of a posi-
tive mood on the basis of the study of Federmeier et al.
(2001), we predict an increase in N400 effect with positive
mood. To our knowledge, the effects of a negative mood
on the comprehension of emotionally neutral sentences
by means of N400 have not yet been investigated. There-
fore, it is an open question how a negative mood affects
on-line semantic processing as tapped by N400.
To provide further evidence that possible changes in
N400 amplitude between the happy and the sad mood
condition reflect emotional factors, correlation analyses
will be computed between the size of the N400 effect
and the mean mood ratings. The presence of significant
correlations between the size of the N400 effect and the
mood ratings would be consistent with the claim that po-
tential changes in N400 amplitude are related to emotional
factors.
METHODS
Participants
There were 32 participants (mean age = 22 years, age
range = 18–31 years). Recent evidence makes clear that
the widespread assumption that subject sex matters lit-
tle if at all in studies on the neurobiology of emotional
memory is no longer tenable and, therefore, should be
abandoned (Cahill, 2006). In line with this preliminary
evidence suggests that female and male participants pro-
cess meaning differently in a positive versus neutral mood
(Federmeier et al., 2001). In the present study, therefore,
we explored the relation between emotion and semantics
in women. Other criteria were as follows: Only those par-
ticipants were selected that reported no drug abuse, neu-
rological, mental, or chronic bodily diseases, or medication
for any of these. All were native speakers of Dutch, had
no reading disabilities, were right-handed, and had normal
or corrected-to-normal vision. Hand dominance was as-
sessed with an abridged Dutch version of the Edinburgh
Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). Sixteen participants reported
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the presence of left-handedness in their immediate family.
One participant had to be excluded from the analyses
because of excessive eye movement artifacts.
Materials
We first constructed 127 simple declarative sentence frag-
ments and used these in a cloze test with 25 subjects to ob-
tain highly expected (“high-cloze”) critical words. Of these
127 sentences, 116 sentences were completed with the
same word by 91% of the participants. These were used as
the high-cloze context sentence fragments in this study.
We then created 116 low-cloze context sentences by
exchanging the critical word from a high-cloze context
fragment with the critical word from another high-cloze
context fragment. For example, we exchanged the critical
word from “In that library the pupils borrow books to take
home” with the critical word from “The pillows are stuffed
with feathers which makes them feel soft,” resulting in the
following low-cloze fragment “The pillows are stuffed with
books which makes them feel hard.” The critical word was
always in mid-sentence position. In an earlier study, we
showed that this type of sentences reliably elicits a stan-
dard N400 cloze effect (Vissers, Chwilla, & Kolk, 2006).
To counteract possible processing strategies, we draw
attention from the critical high- and low-cloze items by
constructing an equal proportion of filler items containing
nonwords. In these filler items, we substituted the critical
high- and low-cloze words by pseudohomophones derived
from the correct words. The pseudohomophones were
created by changing the vowel of the second syllable, keep-
ing phonology the same. Every noun contained two sylla-
bles, and the changed vowels were always in the second
part of the word. This yielded a total set of 464 sentences.
The four versions of each sentence were counterbalanced
across lists. Note that none of the items—neither critical
items nor filler items—were repeated. The same holds
for the context: Each sentence context was presented only
once to a participant, meaning that the high-cloze versus
low-cloze version of a sentence was presented to different
participants. An additional set of 60 filler sentences was
added: 30 correct sentences, 10 sentences with a pseudo-
homophone at the beginning of the sentence, 10 sen-
tences with a pseudohomophone in the middle of the
sentence, and 10 sentences with a pseudohomophone at
the end of the sentence.
Procedure
Participants were seated in a closed chamber. Sentences
were presented in serial visual presentation mode at the
center of a PC monitor. Word duration was 345 msec,
and the SOA was 645 msec. Sentence final words were fol-
lowed by a full stop. The intertrial interval was 2 sec. Words
were presented in black capitals on a white background in
a 9 × 2-cm window at a viewing distance of approximately
1 m. Each sentence was preceded by a fixation cross (dura-
tion 510msec) followed by a 500-msec blank screen. Partic-
ipants were instructed to attentively read the sentences.
The experimental list was split up into four blocks; there
was a pause between blocks, during which a film fragment
was presented and each block was preceded by two filler
items. Because eye movements distort the EEG record-
ing, participants were trained to make eye movements,
for example, blinks, only in the period that the prompt
was present (stimulus duration was 2295 msec). Prompt
offset was followed after 705 msec by a fixation cross, in-
dicating the start of the next trial.
Mood Induction Procedure
Westermann et al. (1996; who compared 11 mood induc-
tion procedures [MIPs] by meta-analytic procedures) have
shown that films or stories are very effective in inducing
positive and negative mood states. The effects are es-
pecially large when subjects—as we did in the present
ERP study—are explicitly instructed to enter the specified
mood state. For elated mood, all other MIPs yielded con-
siderably lower effectiveness scores. Because according to
Westermann et al. the film/story MIP is the first choice to
elicit both positive and negative mood states, we chose
film fragments to induce a positive versus negative mood.
Participants were randomly assigned to the happy mood
condition or to the sad mood condition. Immediately be-
fore the EEG recording, the MIP was started by present-
ing the first film clip to induce the intended mood. To
this aim, film clips were presented from either a happy
movie or a sad movie. The happy movie fragments were
cut from the Warner Brothersʼ movie “Happy Feet”; the
sad movie fragments were cut from a sad movie “Sophieʼs
Choice” (a drama depicting the plight of a Polish woman
during the Second World War). The film clips and the
mood ratings were presented on the same PC monitor
used for the presentation of the language materials. The
participantsʼ mood was manipulated by presenting film
clips that either displayed sequential fragments from the
happymovie or from the sad movie. A pilot study indicated
that these two movies are effective in inducing positive and
negative mood, respectively, in the first year psychology
student population of the Radboud University Nijmegen,
which forms the subject pool for the EEG study. The length
of the film clips varied between 2.48 and 7.27 min, with a
mean length of 5.41min for the happymood condition and
5.47 min for the sad mood condition. Next to the first film
clip presented before the experiment, three additional film
clips were presented between blocks of reading the ex-
perimental sentences. The aim of these film clips was to
prolong the intended mood during the whole experiment.
To check the effectiveness of the MIP before and after each
of the film fragments, participants were asked to rate their
mood on a rating scale (ranging from −10 = extremely
sad, to 0 = neutral, to +10 = extremely happy) that ap-
peared on the screen. Participants indicated their mood
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rating by moving a cursor on a keyboard to the level that
corresponded with their current emotional state.
EEG Data Acquisition and Analysis
The EEG was recorded with 27 tin electrodes mounted in
an elastic electrode cap (Electrocap International, Eaton,
OH) from 5 midline sites and 22 lateral sites (see Figure 5
for the montage). The left mastoid served as reference.
Electrode impedance was less than 3 kΩ. The EOG was re-
corded bipolarly; vertical EOG was recorded by placing an
electrode above and below the right eye, and the horizontal
EOG was recorded via a right to left canthal montage. The
signals were amplified (time constant = 8 sec, band-pass
filter = 0.02–30 Hz) and digitized on-line at 200 Hz. Presen-
tation of stimuli and recording of performance data were
accomplished by a Macintosh computer.
Before analyzing EEG and EOG, records were examined
for artifacts and for excessive EOG amplitude (>100 μV)
from 100 msec before the onset of the critical noun (high-
cloze or low-cloze words), ending the relative clause to
1000 msec after its onset. Averages were aligned to a
100-msec baseline period preceding the critical letter string.
On the basis of the ERP literature, mean amplitudes in
the 300- to 500-msec epoch after critical word onset were
taken as N400 window (e.g., Federmeier, Mai, & Kutas,
2005).
Repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted separately
for the midline sites and for the lateral sites, with cloze
probability (high vs. low) as a within-subject factor and
mood (positive vs. negative) as a between subject factor.
Mood was manipulated between subjects for the follow-
ing reasons: First, on the basis of our pilot study, we were
skeptical about switching on and off a positive versus neg-
ative mood within a single recording session. Second,
although we could have invited the same subjects to a
second recording session, this would have resulted in rep-
etition of the critical stimulus materials. As it can take a long
time before stimulus repetition effects go away (Cave,
1997) and given that ERPs in the time range of N400 are
sensitive to stimulus repetition (e.g., Rugg, 1985), we pre-
ferred not to present the language materials twice.
The midline analyses included the additional factor site
(Fza, Fz, Cz, Pz, Oz). The lateral analysis included the ad-
ditional factors of hemisphere and site (left hemisphere
sites: F7a, F3a, F7, F3, LAT, LT, LTP, P3, P3p, T5, OL; right
hemisphere sites: F8a, F4a, F8, F4, RAT, RT, RTP, P4, P4p,
T6, OR). The estimated Greenhouse–Geisser coefficient
epsilon was used to correct for violations of the assump-
tion of sphericity. All reported p values are based on cor-
rected degrees of freedom.
RESULTS
Effectiveness of the MIP
No differences in mood scores between the two groups of
participants were present before the film clips were pre-
sented (baseline measurement). As Figure 1 shows and
supported by the statistical analyses, the MIP effectively
induced the intended mood. That is, after watching happy
film clips, participants were significantly happier than after
watching sad film clips ( p < .05). Similarly, after watching
sad film clips, participants were significantly sadder than
after watching happy film clips ( p< .05). Note that a signifi-
cant difference in mood scores between the happy and the
sad mood condition was present after each of the film clips.
ERPs
The waveforms are presented separately for each mood
because the analyses (below) revealed an interaction
Figure 1. Mean mood rating
scores ranging from −10
(extremely sad ) to +10
(extremely happy) for the three
film fragments comprising
the MIP separately for the
participants assigned to the
two mood conditions (happy
mood condition vs. sad mood
condition).
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between cloze and mood. The grand mean ERPs for the
happy mood condition for the high-cloze and the low-
cloze items are presented in Figure 2, and those for the
sad mood condition are presented in Figure 3. The critical
words elicited for the visual stimuli characteristic early ERP
response—that is, an N1 followed by a P2, which at occipi-
tal sites was preceded by a P1. These early components
were followed by a broad negative-going wave peaking at
about 400 msec, the N400. Inspection of the waveforms
for the happy mood condition suggests the presence of
a large and widely distributed N400 cloze effect. The
N400 effect seems to show an early onset (around 200
and 250 msec). Inspection of the waveforms for the sad
mood condition suggests the presence of a small N400
cloze effect for a limited set of electrodes only (over the
midline and right hemisphere). In addition, in the sad
mood condition, the N400 seemed to be followed by a
slow positive going wave with larger (more positive) am-
plitudes for low-cloze than high-cloze items.
N400 Window (300–500 msec)
The analyses for themidline and for the lateral sites yielded
main effects of cloze, F(1, 29) = 51.22, p < .001, and F(1,
29) = 40.66, p < .001, respectively, indicating that mean
N400 amplitude was more positive for high-cloze items
than that for low-cloze items.
Figure 2. Grand ERP averages and topographical maps for the happy mood condition, time locked to the onset of the critical noun superimposed
for the two levels of cloze probability (high, low) for all midline sites and a representative subset of lateral sites. The dashed rectangles indicate
the time window (300–500 msec) in which N400 was measured. Negativity is plotted upward. The topographical maps obtained by interpolation
from 27 sites are displayed for the N400 window and the time window capturing the late positivity (600–800 msec). Maps were computed from
values resulting from the subtraction of the waveforms of the high-cloze condition from those of the low-cloze condition.
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No effects of mood were found, both Fs < 1. Most im-
portantly, two-way Cloze × Mood interactions were ob-
tained (midline sites: F(1, 29) = 10.79, p < .001, lateral
sites: F(1, 29) = 5.25, p < .03). On the basis of these in-
teractions, separate analyses were performed for the dif-
ferent mood conditions.
Happy Mood Condition
For the happy mood condition the ANOVA for the mid-
line sites revealed an effect of cloze, F(1, 14) = 18.48,
p < .001. No Cloze × Site interaction was obtained, p >
.14, indicating that the N400 cloze effect for the happy
mood condition was broadly distributed across the mid-
line. The ANOVA for the lateral sites yielded a main effect
of cloze, F(1, 14) = 33.98, p < .001, reflecting that N400
amplitude was smaller for high-cloze relative to low-cloze
items (1.25 vs. −0.79 μV). Apart from an interaction be-
tween hemisphere and site, F(10, 140) = 4.30, p < .01,
which reflected overall differences in amplitude across
sites and/or hemisphere, no interactions with cloze were
present. The absence of interactions of cloze with site
and/or hemisphere supports a broad bilateral scalp distri-
bution of the N400 effect in the happy mood condition.
Figure 3. Grand ERP averages and topographical maps for the sad mood condition, time locked to the onset of the critical noun superimposed
for the two levels of cloze probability for all midline sites and a representative subset of lateral sites. The dashed rectangles indicate the time
window (300–500 msec) in which N400 was measured. Negativity is plotted upward. The topographical maps obtained by interpolation from
27 sites are displayed for the N400 window and the time window capturing the late positivity (600–800 msec). Maps were computed from
values resulting from the subtraction of the waveforms of the high-cloze condition from those of the low-cloze condition.
Chwilla, Virgillito, and Vissers 2407
Sad Mood Condition
For the sad mood condition, the ANOVA for the midline
sites did not yield an effect of cloze, F(1, 15) = 1.92, p =
.185. Although, a Cloze × Site interaction was found, F(4,
60) = 4.95, <.05, follow-up analyses for the single sites
did not yield reliable N400 effects. The ANOVA for the
lateral sites revealed a main effect of cloze, F(1, 15) =
9.23, p < .01. In addition, an interaction between cloze
and hemisphere, F(1, 15) = 9.37, p < .01, and an inter-
action of these two factors with site, F(10, 150) = 5.90,
p < .002, was found. Supplementary analyses for the two
hemispheres yielded the following pattern: The ANOVA
for the right hemisphere revealed a main effect of cloze,
F(1, 15) = 13.28, p < .01. No other effects or interactions
were observed indicating that the N400 effect was wide-
spread across the right hemisphere. The analysis for the
left hemisphere did not yield an effect of cloze, F < 2.6,
but a Cloze × Site interaction, F(10, 150) = 3.34, p < .05.
Follow-up single-site analyses revealed an N400 effect at
the left occipital and temporal sites (OL and T5: ps < .03).
Early Differences (200–300 msec)
To check the reliability of possible early ERP differences,
analyses were carried out on the mean amplitude in the
200- to 300-msec window. These analyses disclosed main
effects of cloze (midline sites: F(1, 29) = 24.96, p < .001;
lateral sites: F(1, 29) = 16.38, p< .001) and Mood × Cloze
interactions (midline sites: F(1, 29) = 8.13, p < .01; lateral
sites: F(1, 29) = 7.71, p < .02). Separate analyses for the
happy mood condition revealed effects of cloze probabil-
ity (midline sites: F(1, 14) = 30.25, p < .001; lateral sites:
F(1, 14) = 22.95, p < .001) in the absence of other effects
or interactions. Separate analyses for the sad mood con-
dition did not yield a reliable effect of cloze (midline sites:
F < 2.35; lateral sites: F < 1.1). However, an interaction
of cloze with hemisphere, F(1, 15) = 6.76, p < .05, re-
flected a cloze effect for the right hemisphere, F(1, 15) =
5.58, p < .04, but not for the left hemisphere, F < 1. The
cloze effects in the early window indicate effects in the
same direction as the standard N400 cloze effect, which
often starts around 250 msec. Hence, these effects are
taken to reflect an early onset of the N400 effect for the
happy and for the sad mood conditions.
Late Positivity (600–800 msec)
To test for differences in late positivity as a function of
mood, analyses were performed for the 600- to 800-msec
window. The analyses disclosed a cloze effect for the mid-
line sites, F(1, 29) = 9.97, p < .01, indicating that mean
amplitudes were more positive to low-cloze than high-
cloze items (3.44 vs. 2.30 μV). The direction of the effect
is thus opposite to that of the N400 effect. For the lat-
eral sites, no effect of cloze, F < 1.5, only a trend towards
a Cloze × Mood interaction, F(1, 29) = 3.26, p < .09,
was found. Supplementary analyses were performed for
smaller time windows (600–700 and 700–800 msec) to
check for the potential presence of a reliable interaction
between mood and cloze. For the 600- to 700-msec win-
dow, no main effects or interactions were found, all Fs <
2. For the 700- to 800-msec window for the midline sites,
a main effect of cloze, F(1, 29) = 8.02, p < .01, and an
interaction of cloze with mood was present, F(1, 29) =
4.40, p < .05. Follow-up analyses revealed a cloze effect
for the sad mood condition, F(1, 15) = 16.35, p < .002,
but not for the happy mood condition, F < 1.3. The lat-
eral analysis for the 700- to 800-msec window revealed
a Mood × Cloze × Hemisphere interaction, F(1, 29) =
4.52, p< .05. Separate analyses for the two levels of mood
and the left versus right hemisphere indicated (a) that no
differences were present for the happy mood condition
and (b) that for the sad mood condition a cloze effect
was present for the left hemisphere, F(1, 15) = 7.86, p <
.02, but not for the right hemisphere, F < 0.5. For the sad
mood condition, Cloze × Site interactions were found for
the left hemisphere, F(10, 150) = 3.13, p< .04, and for the
right hemisphere, F(10, 150) = 10.34, p < .01. Single-site
analyses revealed differences at temporal and parietal elec-
trodes of the left hemisphere (LTP, P3, P3p, and T5: ps <
.05). For the right hemisphere, a difference in the same
direction was present for two posterior sites (P4 and P4p:
ps < .05).3
Correlation Analyses
Throughout this article, we assume that the Mood ×
N400 Cloze interactions reflect emotional factors. To test
whether the modulations in N400 amplitude between
the two mood conditions are accompanied by changes in
emotional state, supplementary Pearson correlations were
computed with the size of the N400 effect and mean mood
rating (computed over three mood ratings per subject) as
factors. The size of the N400 effect was computed by sub-
tracting N400 amplitude in the high-cloze condition from
that in the low-cloze condition; this difference score was
computed for every single electrode and for every subject.
The Bonferroni correction was used to adjust the p val-
ues for multiple (27 electrode site) comparisons (Sankoh,
Huque, & Dubey, 1997). The new alpha level was p =
.0077. As Figure 4 shows, the correlation analyses for the
happy mood condition revealed significant correlations
(rs between −.65 and −.79) between the size of the
N400 effect and the mood ratings for all central and pos-
terior electrodes except from one single site (T5). These
analyses show that the happier the mood, the larger the
N400 effect. With correlations at central/posterior sites
ranging from −.65 to −.79, between 42% and 62% of the
variation in the size of the N400 effect in the happy mood
condition are accompanied by variations in emotional
state. The correlation analyses for the sad mood condition
did not disclose significant correlations between the size
of the N400 effect and the mood ratings.
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Correlation analyses were also performed for the late
positivity to check whether changes in amplitude were ac-
companied by changes in mood. The Bonferroni-corrected
p value for multiple comparisons was p = .0081. For the
happy mood condition, no correlations were found. The
analyses for the sad mood condition, however, revealed
significant correlations (rs between .63 and .67) between
the amplitude of the late positivity and the mood ratings
at the frontal midline site (Fz: r = .65, p < .007) and one
posterior site of the right hemisphere (RTP: r = .67, p <
.004). These analyses unveil that the less sad the partici-
pant, the larger the late positive effect.
DISCUSSION
The goal of this article was to test abstract symbol theories
against embodied theories of meaning by investigating the
effects of emotional context on semantic processing. To
this aim, we induced a happy mood versus a sad mood
and investigated whether a participantʼs emotional state
affects processes of language comprehension, in particu-
lar on-line semantic processing as reflected by N400. The
predictions for the two classes of theories are as follows:
On the classical, abstract symbol view, processing of word
meaning par excellence is a modular process (Pinker,
1997; Fodor, 1975). Hence, context should not affect the
Figure 4. Pearson correlations
on an idealized head, looking
down, nose at the top, between
the size of the N400 effect
and the mood ratings, for the
happy mood condition. The
set of electrodes that showed
significant r values are displayed
in gray.
Figure 5. The size of the N400 effect (computed by subtracting
N400 amplitude in the high-cloze condition from that in the low-cloze
condition) was correlated with the mean mood ratings. The scatter
diagram shows a strong relation between the N400 effect of cloze
probability and emotional state at the vertex (r = −.785, p = .001).
The best-fitting regression line is also plotted.
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representation of word meaning. This implies that a partici-
pantʼs emotional state should not have any impact on pro-
cessing of wordmeaning. In contrast, according to embodied
views, the process of language understanding is inherently
perceptual (e.g., Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Glenberg et al.,
2005). Words are meaningful because they are grounded
in perception, action, and emotion. In line with this, em-
bodied researchers propose that language and emotion
interact (e.g., Havas et al., 2007). If indeed language is
grounded in internal bodily states, then a participantʼs emo-
tional condition should affect semantic processing in lan-
guage comprehension.
In this article, we tested embodied views versus abstract
symbol views of meaning against each other by exploring
whether the well-known N400 effect of cloze probability is
modulated by emotional context. The results on this point
are clear-cut: The ERP results reveal that a participantʼs
emotional state modulates semantic processing as tapped
by N400. This was indicated by interactions between mood
and the N400 cloze effect, both for the midline sites and
for the lateral sites. These interactions reflect a strong
reduction of the N400 cloze effect for the sad mood
condition compared with the happy mood condition. In
particular, the analyses for the midline sites revealed the
presence of a clear N400 effect for the happy mood con-
dition but absence of an N400 effect for the sad mood
condition. The absence of an N400 effect across the mid-
line for the sad mood condition is remarkable given that
the centroparietal midline sites (Cz and Pz) typically show
profound N400 cloze effects. The interaction between
mood and cloze probability for the lateral sites indicated
that the N400 cloze effect for the happy mood condition
showed a widespread bilateral distribution, including an-
terior, central, temporal, posterior, and occipital sites. In
contrast, for the sad mood condition, an N400 cloze effect
was limited to the right hemisphere and two sites of the left
hemisphere. In other words, a sad mood led to a disappear-
ance of the N400 effect at the midline as well as a strong re-
duction in the number of electrodes of the left hemisphere
that showed N400 effects. Whereas in the happy mood
condition except from F7 all sites showed N400 effects, for
the sad mood condition an N400 effect was only present at
the left occipital (OL) and temporal sites (T5).
The present ERP results have implications for current
theories on the representation of word meaning. In particu-
lar, the modulation of on-line semantic processes by a par-
ticipantʼs emotional state—as demonstrated by the mood
by N400 cloze interactions—supports embodied views of
meaning and challenges abstract symbol views of meaning.
With regard to the effects of a positive mood, the present
N400 results accord well with those of Federmeier et al.
(2001), who reported a facilitation of semantic processing
for a (mildly) positive as opposed to a neutral mood. Im-
portantly, the results of the correlation analyses demon-
strate that the modulation in N400 amplitude reported in
the present study was accompanied by significant changes
in mood ratings. In particular, for the happy mood condi-
tion, there was a strong correlation between the size of
the N400 cloze effect and the mood scores with an increase
in the N400 cloze effect with increasing happiness. Of in-
terest here is that all central and posterior sites that typi-
cally show large N400 semantic context effects showed
significant correlations (see Figure 4). For the sad mood
condition in which a general decrease in N400 effect was
found, no significant correlations between the size of the
N400 cloze effect and the mood scores were observed at
central-posterior sites. Inspection of the ERP scatter plots
for the different electrodes of individual participants in the
sad mood condition unveiled that several subjects showed
reversed N400 effects. These reversed effects led to a re-
striction of the range on which the correlation analyses
were based compared with the happy mood condition
(where no reversed effects were present). It is very likely
that the restricted range in N400 effects for the sad mood
condition resulted in lower correlation coefficients.
Possible Contribution of More General Processes
Like Attention and/or Motivation
The proposal that processing of word meaning is affected
by emotional context is new and at odds with the tradi-
tional view that word meaning is performed by a central
cognitive module. A relevant question that has to be ad-
dressed is whether the present N400 Mood × Cloze Prob-
ability interaction could be accounted for by other more
general processes like attention and/or motivation. For
instance, it could be argued that the N400 modulation re-
flects that participants in a sad mood are preoccupied with
the drama presented in the film and, hence, do not pro-
cess the sentences for meaning. Although we cannot rule
out with certainty that more general processes, in addition
to the factor mood, may have contributed to the N400 pat-
tern reported in this article, we consider this possibility as
rather unlikely for the following reasons:
First, if participants after watching the sad film clips would
not have attended the meaning of the sentences, then no
N400 effect should have occurred in this condition. How-
ever, the data prove otherwise: Although the N400 effect
for the sad participants was reliably reduced compared with
the happy mood condition, a significant N400 effect was
still obtained for the right hemisphere and two electrodes
of the left hemisphere. The very presence of an N400 ef-
fect in the sad mood condition therefore speaks against
the argument that sad participants simply did not pay
attention to the critical materials. The question remains
whether the reduction in N400 effect for the sad as opposed
to the happy mood may reflect that sad participants paid
less attention to the sentences than the happy participants.
The correlation analyses show that the N400 modulation
as a function of mood was accompanied by significant
changes in mood ratings. Whether the N400 modulation
was also accompanied by changes in attention and/or moti-
vation is an empirical question. Future studies are needed
to tease apart the effects of attention, motivation, and
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mood. One way, for example, to explore the relation be-
tween attention and mood would be to manipulate besides
the factor mood (happy versus sad, induced by video frag-
ments) the factor attention, for instance by comparing a
selective attention task with a divided attention task. In this
way, the effect of mood and the effect of attention can be
explored separately.
A second reason why we consider it unlikely that the
present N400 Mood × Cloze Probability interaction re-
flects more general factors like attention and/or motivation
comes from the emotion literature. In the emotion litera-
ture, it is generally agreed upon that differences in mood
do not lead to quantitative differences in cognitive pro-
cessing or to a general attenuation of cognitive processes.
Conversely, there is firm evidence that differences in mood
lead to qualitative different strategies and that mood-
dependent processing styles exist; for example, happy
people are inclined for global, category level of process-
ing information, whereas sad people are inclined to local,
item-specific processing (e.g., Schwarz, 2002). Hence, sad
moods do not lead to less cognitive processing (e.g., de-
crease in attention and/or motivation) and happy moods
do not lead to more cognitive processing (e.g., increase
in attention and/or motivation). However, mood induc-
tion leads to qualitative differences in cognitive processing
(e.g., from a top–down processing style in happy mood to
a bottom–up processing style in sad mood). On the basis
of the emotion literature, therefore, we propose that the
reduction of the N400 effect in sad people does not in-
dicate a general reduction/attenuation of cognitive pro-
cesses (e.g., a decrease in attention and/or motivation)
but does reflect a qualitative change in processing strategy
(from the use of heuristics in a happy mood to more de-
tailed processing in a sad mood).
Nature of the Simulation Process
According to embodied theories, language understanding
is grounded in a participantʼs bodily state. As proposed by
Niedenthal (2007), perceiving and thinking about emo-
tion involve perceptual, somatovisceral, and motoric re-
experiencing (simulation) of the relevant emotion in oneʼs
self. For the domain of language, it has been put forward
that there is a close relation between emotion on the one
hand and the way in which we understand emotional lan-
guage on the other hand (Havas et al., 2007). The results
of the present study reveal that emotional context has an
immediate impact on semantic processes involved in lan-
guage comprehension. The fact that we demonstrate an
on-line modulation of semantic processing by mood em-
pirically supports the existence of an interaction between a
personʼs emotional state and semantics. The mechanism
proposed to mediate effects of emotion on language is via
simulation of an emotional state.
The mental simulation process lies at the heart of em-
bodied approaches to cognition in general and language
comprehension in specific. It could be argued that this
simulation process represents some kind of strategy that
is under attentional control and—opposite to symbolic
processing which is automatic—is of a more controlled
nature. The nature of the simulation process has been in-
vestigated by Chwilla et al. (2007). They tested the auto-
maticity of the N400 effect to novel meanings by varying
task. In Experiment 1, participants judged the sensibility
of sentences, whereas in Experiment 2, participants did
nothing else than read for comprehension. The basic idea
was that automatic simulation should occur regardless of
task. Novel sensible contexts compared with novel sense-
less contexts (e.g., to paddle with Frisbees vs. to paddle
with pullovers) elicited an N400 effect. This N400 effect
generalized from the judgment task in which the sensibil-
ity of the action was in the center of the attention to nor-
mal reading. Crucially, the N400 effect to novel meanings
occurred in the same time frame (300–500 msec) as the
classical N400 effect to semantic relations. This shows that
novel meanings are immediately established. Regarding
the nature of the simulation process, both the immediacy
and the task independence of the N400 effect to novel
meanings support an automatic nature of the mental sim-
ulation process.
Mood-dependent Processing Styles
As sketched above in the emotion literature, it is generally
agreed upon that there exist mood-dependent processing
styles. A positive mood leads to greater cognitive flexibility
and a broader focus, relying less on the details of a situation
andmore on top–down schematic processing (Fredrickson,
1998). It validates accessible cognition and leads to a more
global, category level of processing of information, that is,
relating incoming information to what is already known
on the basis of our world knowledge including schemas
and stereotypes (e.g., Gasper & Clore, 2002; Kimchi &
Palmer, 1982). This processing strategy fits well with the
facilitation of semantic processing in happy people, as re-
flected by strong N400 context effects to high-cloze sen-
tences representing highly familiar scenarios on the basis
of our world knowledge (e.g., “borrowing books in a li-
brary” or “picking flowers in a meadow”; for empirical
support of N400 sensitivity to familiar forms of world knowl-
edge, see Chwilla & Kolk, 2005).
Negative mood, in contrast, seems to focus our atten-
tion more narrowly on specific details of a situation: It
invalidates accessible cognitions and fosters local, item-
specific processing (e.g., Schwarz, 2002). In a recent re-
view on the effects of emotion on cognition, Clore and
Huntsinger (2007) propose that many famous phenomena
in cognitive science such as semantic priming, global
superiority effect, and false memories occur when people
are in a positive mood but do not arise or occur in a
reduced form, when people are in a negative mood. An
important conclusion from this article is that the reduction
in standard N400 cloze effect with sad mood supports the
proposal that standard cognitive phenomena mainly occur
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in a happy mood. Above all, this N400 reduction fits well
with the above described proposal that people in a sad
mood are less open to accessible cognitions of what usually
happens in the world around us.
The ERP data reveal a second difference in ERP pattern
as a function of a participantʼs emotional state. A modula-
tion in a late positivity (quantified in the 600-to 800-msec
epoch), with larger more positive going amplitudes for
low-cloze items as opposed to high-cloze items, was only
observed for the sad mood and not for the happy mood
condition. In the domain of language, positivities in this
latency range are typically taken to reflect processes of
reanalysis (e.g., Vissers, Kolk, & Chwilla, 2008; Kuperberg,
2007). It is not yet clear what the difference in late positiv-
ity reflects. One may argue that this late positive effect
reflects a delay of processing the cloze manipulation for
the sad relative to the happy group. However, it has to
be pointed out that although the N400 effect for the sad
group is significantly reduced as reflected by the absence
of an N400 cloze effect for the midline sites and most
electrodes of the left hemisphere, a reliable N400 effect
of cloze was still obtained for the right hemisphere and
two left posterior electrodes. The residual N400 cloze effect
reveals that the participants in the sad mood condition did
not simply miss the meanings of the words comprising the
low- versus high-cloze sentences but processed the words
for meaning. Therefore, one could speculate that the pres-
ence versus absence of the late positive effect may reflect
differences in reanalysis between groups. Specifically, the
presence of a late positive effect only for the sad mood
condition could reflect that sad people are more inclined
than happy people to reanalyze low-cloze sentences, rep-
resenting implausible scenarios (e.g., that pillows are
stuffed with books). This speculation would fit with a basic
finding from the emotion literature that sad people are
biased toward local, detail-oriented processing whereas
happy people are more inclined to top–down processing.
Several studies in the literature have reported modu-
lations in late positivities for emotional language mate-
rials (e.g., Herbert et al., 2008). Kanske and Kotz (2007)
observed an increase in a late positivity to negative stimuli
compared with positive stimuli, even when the attentional
and arousing properties of the stimuli were controlled
for. In a recent study, Holt, Lynn, and Kuperberg (2009)
reported an increase in a late positivity both for negative
and positive words relative to neutral ones, with larger
amplitudes to negative than positive words. They inter-
preted these results within a more general hypothesis
about affective processing; that is, the “negativity bias”
which evolved from social psychology. According to this
hypothesis, negatively valenced information yields more
complex representations and requires more cognitive pro-
cessing than positively valenced information (e.g., Dahl,
2001). In the Holt et al. study the emotional significance
of the language materials led to continued processing, ac-
companied by modulations in late positivity. In the pres-
ent article, it is the background emotional state one is in
that matters. Future studies are needed to specify whether,
and if so how, these late positivities are related and what
the functional significance of these effects is.
Hemispheric Specialization
Kutas and Federmeier (2000) on the basis of visual half-
field studies have proposed that the two hemispheres
play different roles in on-line semantic processing. Em-
pirical support for this claim comes from a study in which
they compared the N400 to a highly expected exemplar
with the N400 to a within-category violation or between-
category violation (same materials as used in the study of
Federmeier et al., 2001; e.g., “They wanted to make the
hotel lookmore like a tropical resort. So, along the driveway
they planted rows of palms” [expected exemplar], “pines”
[within-category violation], “tulips” [between-category vio-
lation].) The critical word was flashed to the right visual
field (input for the left hemisphere) or to the left visual
field (input for the right hemisphere). For the left hemi-
sphere, a significant N400 difference was found for the
within-category violation compared with the between-
category violation. No such difference was present for the
right hemisphere. On the basis of these results, Kutas and
Federmeier (2000) argued that the left hemisphere capi-
talizes on the organization of semantic memory to pre-
activate the meaning of forthcoming words, even if this
strategy fails at times. The left hemisphere is, thus, biased
towards prediction thereby enabling subjects to process
language at the amazing speed and with the high-efficiency
characteristic for normal language usage. On the other
hand, based on the absence of an N400 amplitude differ-
ence between violations for the right hemisphere, they
proposed that this hemisphere exploits a plausibility-based
integration strategy. In the present article, differences in
scalp distribution were observed with mood. Although
for the happy mood condition a widely bilaterally dis-
tributed N400 effect was obtained, the N400 effect for the
sad mood condition was mainly restricted to the right
hemisphere. At face value, the bilateral widely distributed
N400 effect for the happy mood condition seems to indi-
cate that happy people use both a predictive and an inte-
gration strategy. The right hemisphere dominance of the
N400 effect for the sad mood condition, on the other
hand, suggests that sad people mainly exploit an integra-
tion strategy and refrain from making predictions of what
comes next.
In this article, we explored the effects of a participantʼs
emotional state on language comprehension. In line with
embodied views,mood is a psychological state that involves
multiple systems including the cognitive system, the per-
ceptual system, the action system, and the somatovisceral
system. The information streams from all these systems
enter into one single multimodal representation; when
one is happy or sad, the happiness or sadness is evident
from multiple interacting systems. As the present N400
data show, mood enters language understanding through
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the information embodied in affective feelings via these
multiple systems.
Conclusion
The interaction between a personʼs emotional state and
semantics reported in this article provides further support
for embodied views of meaning and challenges abstract
symbol theories of meaning. The N400 data are consistent
with the proposal of Havas et al. (2007) that language can
be grounded in the bodily states that comprise emotions.
At a more general level, the ERP results accord well with a
recent shift in cognitive science and the field of language
comprehension, from modular to (more) interactive pro-
cessing models. Several investigators have provided evi-
dence for interactions between language and action and
language and perception. The interplay between emotion
and language on the other hand has received little atten-
tion. The challenge of future studies will be to further
our understanding about the workings and nature of the
mechanism(s) that mediate the effects of emotional factors
on language.
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Notes
1. For a comparison of measures of semantic memory and
how they can be used to separate different automatic priming
models, the reader is referred to Chwilla and Kolk (2002) for a
reaction time study and to Chwilla, Kolk, and Mulder (2000) for
an ERP study.
2. The amount of contextual constraint imposed by a sentence
fragment can be determined by a cloze probability test. The cloze
probability refers to the proportion of participants that fill in a
particular word as the best completion of a sentence fragment.
3. Note that an effect in the opposite direction (more positive
amplitudes for high than low cloze items) was found at three
anterior sites (F8a, F8, and RAT: ps < .05).
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